What We Don\u27t Know About Class Actions but Hope to Know Soon by Gelbach, Jonah B. & Hensler, Deborah R.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 1 Article 4 
2018 
What We Don't Know About Class Actions but Hope to Know Soon 
Jonah B. Gelbach 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Deborah R. Hensler 
Stanford Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jonah B. Gelbach and Deborah R. Hensler, What We Don't Know About Class Actions but Hope to Know 
Soon, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 65 (2018). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss1/4 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 65 
WHAT WE DON’T KNOW 
ABOUT CLASS ACTIONS 
BUT HOPE TO KNOW SOON 
Jonah B. Gelbach* & Deborah R. Hensler** 
INTRODUCTION 
Legislation that would alter class action practice in the federal courts has 
been pending in Congress.  Nearly a decade’s worth of U.S. Supreme Court 
cases have restricted the scope and ease of use of the class action device. 
Class action critics argue that class litigation is a “racket” that fails to 
compensate plaintiffs and instead enriches plaintiffs’ lawyers at the expense 
of legitimate business practices.1  On the other hand, defenders of class 
actions decry the legislative and judicial forces aligned against them, warning 
that trends in class action law will eviscerate the practical rights held by 
consumers and workers.2  In short, there is considerable controversy over 
whether class actions are an economic menace or a boon to the little guys. 
Notwithstanding the fierceness of the class action debate and the apparent 
confidence of opponents and proponents in their factual assertions, there is a 
lot we do not know about federal court class actions, and we have no data 
that can be used to reliably determine whether class actions are good, bad, or 
some of each.  In fact, we do not even know how many federal class actions 
there are.3  The absence of data on federal (and state) class actions, various 
explanations for the absence, and the import of this absence, were elaborated 
upon by one of us in another article not long ago.4 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
**  Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution, Stanford Law School.  This Article 
was prepared for the Fordham Law Review Symposium entitled Civil Litigation Reform in the 
Trump Era:  Threats and Opportunities, held at Fordham University School of Law on 
February 23, 2018. 
 
 1. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class:  Aggregate Litigation in the Wake 
of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 626 (2012); David Marcus, The 
History of the Modern Class Action, Part II:  Litigation and Legitimacy, 1981–1994, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1828 (2018) (quoting other sources that describe class actions as 
“shakedowns” and “bludgeon[ings]”). 
 2. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Myriam Gilles, Congress’s Judicial 
Mistrust, Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) (Apr. 3, 2017). 
 3. See infra Part I for a discussion of several unknown factors concerning federal class 
action lawsuits. 
 4. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary, Rule 23!  Shouldn’t We 
Know You Better After All This Time?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1599 (2017). 
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We have two purposes in this brief Article.  First, we wish to focus 
continuing attention on the need for more empirical information about the 
actual functioning of the federal class action system.  Second, we wish to 
share our current efforts to use a one-of-a-kind collection of docket reports, 
originally harvested from Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
(PACER),5 to fill the empirical gap.  Presentation of empirical findings 
resulting from this effort awaits a future article.  However, this Article 
includes suggestions as to how the federal judiciary and Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts (“AO”) could improve data management 
and data reporting so as to make information about federal class actions more 
accessible to scholars and others interested in how the class action device 
operates in practice and what reforms, if any, would be advisable. 
I.  WHAT WE STILL DON’T KNOW, AND WHY IT MATTERS6 
For a case to proceed as a class action in federal court, a class must be 
certified by judicial order pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.7  Are there many such cases?  In what fraction of the 250,000 to 
300,000 civil actions filed in U.S. district courts in a typical year8 do 
plaintiffs even seek a certification order?9  We do not know.  Of those class 
complaints that are certified, we do not know how many are dismissed before 
reaching the merits.  Of those that reach judgment on the merits, we do not 
know how many are disposed of on summary judgment and how many reach 
trial (although we do know that trial is generally very rare).10  Nor do we 
know how often certified class actions are terminated due to settlement at 
any stage of litigation. 
We also do not know the distribution of putative class actions across 
different areas of the law, whether state or federal, common law or statutory 
in origin.  We do not know how much litigation effort is expended on these 
cases, either by the lawyers or the judiciary.  We do not know how often class 
actions and multidistrict litigation (MDL) overlap. 
 
 5. PACER:  PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS, https://www.pacer.gov 
[https://perma.cc/KK7T-KASL] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 6. This Part largely follows Hensler, supra note 4. 
 7. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). 
 8. For the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2017, 267,769 civil actions were 
filed in U.S. district courts. Table C-2:  U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by 
Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 
2016 and 2017, U.S. CTS., at 1, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/ 
jb_c2_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3D8-YJGW] [hereinafter Table C-2].  In the year 
prior, 291,851 civil actions had been filed. Id. 
 9. Rule 23 allows any party to seek class certification, but defendant classes are very 
rare. 
 10. See Table C-4:  U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and 
Action Taken, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2017, U.S. CTS., at 1, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c4_0930.2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3N4M-X82W] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) (reporting that only 0.9 percent 
of federal civil cases terminated during the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2017, 
reached trial); see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Diminished Trial, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2131, 2131–37 (2018) (discussing the general downward trends in federal civil trials). 
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In short, we do not know a lot of things that would seem critical to know 
for anyone arguing anything about the performance of class actions, or how 
to improve that performance, much less to support rational policy reform. 
To be sure, there is some empirical research on class actions.  The most 
well-researched area is securities fraud litigation, thanks in part to the 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC).  SCAC collects docket 
information and case documents for securities class actions filed since 
1995.11  Anyone can search the data collection, and numerous research 
papers have been written using that data.  Perhaps as a result, there has been 
a large amount of scholarship concerning securities class actions.12 
What about outside the securities arena?  There are a number of empirical 
studies of various aspects of the class action system, including attorney’s fees 
in class action settlements13 and the role of docket congestion in determining 
whether proposed settlements are approved.14  Many other examples 
abound.15  We do not mean to devalue these empirical studies.  To the 
contrary, we laud their authors for producing them despite the general 
difficulty of acquiring data on class actions. 
Still, it is remarkable how few basic facts about class actions we actually 
know.  Following recent suggestions one of us made, we propose that to 
begin to make sense of the performance of the class action system, we need, 
at a minimum, to know: 
1.  The number of class complaints filed annually, by case type (e.g., 
securities, anti-trust, consumer fraud, product liability), party 
characteristics, venue and category of certification (i.e., (b)(1)(a), (b)(1)(b), 
(b)(2), or (b)(3)). 
2.  The mode of disposition of these complaints, whether dropped, 
dismissed, decided by summary judgment, tried to verdict or settled. 
3.  Time to disposition. 
 
 11. About Us, SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://securities.stanford.edu/about-
the-scac.html#about [https://perma.cc/8W4L-NE52] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 12. See, e.g., Lynn Baker et al., Is the Price Right?  An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting in 
Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371 (2015); Lynn Baker et al., Setting 
Attorneys’ Fees in Securities Class Actions:  An Empirical Assessment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
1677, 1691 (2013); Stephen J. Choi et al., The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 
8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 650 (2011); Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland & Matthew 
Goforth, When Are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When Do They Settle, and for How 
Much?—An Update, 26 PLUS J., Apr. 2013. 
 13. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in 
Class Action Settlements:  1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010); Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811 (2010). 
 14. See, e.g., Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Effect of Judicial Expedience on 
Attorney Fees in Class Actions, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 171 (2007). 
 15. Hensler, supra note 4, at 1603 n.19 (“There is a voluminous literature on Rule 23 class 
actions.  Although much of the literature is limited to doctrinal and normative analysis, a 
significant fraction of publications cite empirical data.  Reviewing and synthesizing the 
empirical evidence presented in scholarly and public policy literature is beyond the scope of 
this Article.”). 
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4.  Whether or not these complaints were ever certified as class actions, 
either for all purposes or for settlement only. 
5.  Whether certification occurred prior to or following judicial decision on 
pre-trial dispositive motions. 
6.  Whether there were Daubert or other evidentiary hearings on 
certification. 
7.  Whether the complaint was resolved as part of a multidistrict litigation 
(MDL). 
8.  Whether there was appellate litigation related to the certification 
decision and the outcome of this litigation. 
9.  Whether the final outcome of the complaint at the district court level 
was appealed and the outcome of the appeal.16 
In the long run, information sufficient to answer these questions should be 
gathered through the Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) 
system run by the AO.  The AO should make available such information, in 
an appropriate format, for academic and government researchers, and, 
perhaps, the general public (see below regarding the PACER revenue 
stream).  A complementary plan would be for the Judicial Conference to ask 
either the AO or the Federal Judicial Center to regularly report on class action 
statistics. 
II.  OUR NASCENT EMPIRICAL PROJECT ON CLASS ACTIONS 
John Maynard Keynes once wrote that “In the long run, we are all dead,”17 
and we should not wait that long to learn the basics of what is going on in 
class action practice.  Part II sketches how we are using docket report 
information to begin to answer the questions above.18 
In 2011, Thomson Reuters entered into an agreement with Yale Law 
School to provide docket report text from Westlaw’s database of U.S. district 
court civil docket reports, which Westlaw refers to as the “DCT” database.  
This contract was funded through a grant generously provided by Yale’s 
Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund.  The grant proposal was submitted jointly by 
one of us, Gelbach, and William N. Eskridge, Jr.  Under the agreement, which 
lasted for three years, Thomson Reuters provided the universe of docket 
report activity for civil actions filed on or after January 1, 2005, with 
coverage continuing through the end of 2014.  Thus, the resulting database 
includes ten years of docket activity for all civil actions filed in U.S. district 
courts between 2005 and 2014.19 
The docket report text is exactly what Thomson Reuters receives from 
“scraping” the PACER website (except that certain privacy filtering is done 
 
 16. Id. at 1605–06 (footnotes omitted). 
 17. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923). 
 18. See supra Part I. 
 19. Information is not available for docket activity after the end of 2014 for cases still 
pending at that time. 
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to remove information such as social security numbers).  Thus, with respect 
to docket activity, this database contains the functional equivalent of PACER 
itself.20  There are more than 2.8 million unique cases represented in this 
database.21  Altogether, Thomson Reuters provided the text of over 170 
million docket entries.  Excluding duplicates, there are a bit more than 85 
million textually unique docket entries. 
Some of the information is provided via case-level metadata, including the 
docket number, information about the district court where the suit was filed, 
and the PACER nature of suit.  The database also provides the names of and 
other information about all parties and their attorneys, and the date, if any, 
on which the involvement of a party or an attorney terminated.  Also included 
in the metadata is the name of the judge assigned to the case, but this 
information changes when a case is reassigned or transferred, such as via the 
MDL panel.  Therefore, presiding judge information likely will have to be 
recovered via analysis of the docket report itself.  The database does not 
include all the information that appears in a case’s civil cover sheet.22  As a 
result, we have to identify putative class actions from searches of entry-level 
text.  This turns out to be an involved process. 
Entry-level text has important structure, which makes it possible to use 
pattern-matching text searches for some tasks.  For example, entries that 
represent the docketing of a first complaint begin with the word 
“COMPLAINT.”23  Below is a result from searching the relevant table in our 
database for docket report entries that begin with the word “COMPLAINT”: 
COMPLAINT AGAINST MEDVENTIVE LLC FILING FEE: $ 350, 
RECEIPT NUMBER 743327, FILED BY ROBERT J. MONIZ. 
(ATTACHMENTS: #1 CIVIL COVER SHEET)(BOYCE, KATHY) 
(ENTERED: 08/14/2006).24 
Although searching for complaints may be simple to do using pattern-
matching text, identifying putative class actions is much more complicated 
due to the significant variation in the way relevant text appears in the docket 
entries of these cases.  A simple search for “RULE 23,” “FRCP 23,” or “FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23” will be both underinclusive and overinclusive.  On the 
 
 20. The database provided by Thomson Reuters does not include any docketed 
documents, such as complaints, answers, briefs, or judicial memoranda, filed with the clerk of 
court.  Where necessary or useful, those documents can be obtained from PACER or electronic 
databases that have previously obtained them from PACER. 
 21. There are several hundred thousand additional cases in the database that appear to 
have been filed before 2005; it is unclear why these cases were included. 
 22. If the cover sheet reliably captured whether the complaint was filed in class form, this 
would be a significant loss.  However, extensive analysis conducted by the Federal Judicial 
Center indicates that the information provided by the attorney in Section VII of the cover sheet 
(the class action check box) is frequently in error. See Hensler, supra note 4, at 1616–17.  
 23. Text in PACER typically is capitalized. 
 24. Moniz v. MedVentive LLC, No. 1:06-cv-11404 (D. Mass. Aug. 9, 2006), ECF No. 1.  
This is the first docket entry in Moniz v. MedVentive LLC, case number 1:06-cv-11404, filed 
in the District of Massachusetts on August 9, 2006.  The case’s nature of suit code is 360, 
which indicates it involves “TORTS:  Other Personal Injury.” Civil Cover Sheet, Moniz v. 
MedVentive LLC, No. 1:06-cv-11404 (D. Mass. Aug. 9, 2006), ECF No. 1-2. 
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overinclusive side, the phrase “RULE 23” sometimes appears in docket 
entries that involve something other than Rule 23, such as shareholder 
derivative suits brought under Rule 23.1.25  On the other hand, the variations 
on “RULE 23” listed above also yield an underinclusive set of matches 
because the person using the CM/ECF system to enter text into the docket 
often has significant discretion in how to characterize the document.  Class-
relevant docket entries might therefore never mention Rule 23, instead being 
framed as “MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS ACTION,” “CLASS ACTION 
COMPLAINT,” or “CLASS COMPLAINT.”26 
Because of the lack of textual structure in class-action-relevant docket 
entries, we had to experiment quite a bit before settling on a pattern-matching 
algorithm with which to identify putative class actions.  We believe we now 
have a high-quality algorithm.  This algorithm should allow us to answer 
arguably the most fundamental empirical question:  how many putative class 
actions were filed in various courts, in various nature of suit categories, and 
in various years?  The next question we will tackle will be what happens to 
these putative class actions.  This question likely will be even more 
challenging to answer. 
Although docket reports contain substantial information related to 
dispositive events, that information does not necessarily come in a neat form.  
For example, a motion for class certification might be granted as to some 
claims but not others, or the motion might be granted but for a narrowed class 
definition relative to the movants’ request.  Such results could be docketed 
in forms such as “MOTION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 
PART” or “MOTION GRANTED AS TO CLAIMS 1–3 AND DENIED AS 
TO ALL OTHER CLAIMS,” and so on.27  Similarly, a motion to dismiss or 
a motion for summary judgment might be granted as to some claims but not 
others, as to some movants but not others, as to some respondents and not 
others, or with or without prejudice. 
Such textual variation means that we will again have to experiment with 
pattern-matching algorithms.  As we did with the simple counts of putative 
class actions, we are employing human research assistants to code random 
samples of cases as a way to cross-check and, in some ways, inform our 
pattern-matching approach.  If necessary, we may use machine learning 
algorithms to leverage the results of human coding.28  The upshot to all this 
 
 25. See, e.g., Kent v. Stoelting, No. 2:17-cv-00893-PP (E.D. Wis. Nov. 17, 2017), ECF 
No. 18 (“BRIEF in Opposition filed by Jesse Kent re 13 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 23.1 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Hardy v. Ducote, No. 1:02-cv-1520 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2002), ECF No. 33 
(“MOTION . . . to certify class action”); Lewert v. Boiron, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-10803 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 29, 2011), ECF No. 1 (“CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT against Defendants Boiron Inc, 
Boiron USA Inc, Laboratories Boiron.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Lewert, ECF No. 217 (“ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 
MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION . . . .”). 
 28. This could work because the results of human coding can serve as the basis for what 
is known as classification, which allows us to use machine learning algorithms to predict how 
cases not coded by humans would be classified if they were so coded.  Such algorithms 
perform very well in many applications involving natural language processing. 
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is that this project will be time-consuming and, very possibly, subject to error.  
The reason is that the data we are using were created with the practicalities 
of litigation, rather than research, in mind. 
One final question for future consideration as part of this project is whether 
the Judicial Conference could make small changes to the CM/ECF system 
that would make measurement of class action results less difficult, obviating 
the need for such extensive efforts.  For example, the CM/ECF system could 
be modified so that the clerk of the court flags cases in which class 
certification has been sought.  It could be modified so that events that 
terminate claims, parties, or both, are better recorded.  Another question for 
the Judicial Conference is whether it would make sense to provide more 
widespread scholarly access to the information stored in PACER to help 
develop better tools for measuring not just class actions, but also other forms 
of litigation.  The CM/ECF system is funded by PACER fee revenue, so 
either Congress would have to increase funding to the judiciary or increases 
in access would have to be done in ways that do not cannibalize the PACER 
revenue stream.  Although this is a topic for another day, we believe that 
would be possible. 
